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Cross-Jurisdictional Conflicts: An
Analysis of Legitimate State
Interests on Federal and
Indian Lands
Charles F Wilkinson *
INTRODUCTION
During the last fifteen years the stakes have steadily gone up in
the combat among the state, tribal and federal governments on
federal and Indian lands. Tensions have been aggravated by the
familiar exertions of too many bureaucrats from various govern-
ments seeking to shoehorn their jurisdiction into every available
vacant hollow. The conflict in the American West has also in-
volved increasingly big money. Leaving aside the private fortunes
to be made, so sallow a phrase as "jurisdiction" sets the ground
rules for the annual distribution of billions of dollars of tax reve-
nues and in-lieu payments.'
But the emotional stakes may be higher yet. We have seen it in
the eyes of those westerners watching the helicopter lifts of wild
horses and burros out of sage and juniper canyons-in the eyes of
people like Wild Horse Annie, who have expended so much of
their souls to provide some measure of benevolence to these ani-
mals, and in the eyes of ranchers who view the same animals as
pests that steal valuable forage from cows and sheep and that
* Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Oregon; during the writing of
this article Visiting Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Minnesota. Ellen
Guerin and Valerie Lind Hedquist made major contributions toward the publication
of this piece. I dedicate this article to Prof. Ralph W. Johnson of the University of
Washington School of Law, who has as good a mind and spirit as the public and
Indian lands know, or are likely to know.
1. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL., PAYMENTS IN
LIEU OF TAXES ON FEDERAL REAL PROPERTY (1981), U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL AND STATE
TAXES ON THE DOMESTIC MINERALS INDUSTRY (1981); ADVISORY COMM. ON INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL REL., THE ADEQUACY OF FEDERAL COMPENSATION TO LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS FOR TAX EXEMPT FEDERAL LANDS (1978).
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erode away hillsides with their clumsy, plate-sized hoofs. 2 We
have heard the essence of the conflict in the blaring horns of
hardworking California North Coast loggers who organized noisy
caravans of log trucks to drown out equally impassioned pleas of
environmentalists at congressional hearings on an expanded Red-
wood Park.3 The California State Director of the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) is quite confident that he both saw and heard
the millennial conflict when he stood on a sand dune in the South-
ern California desert during the hottest days of the off-road-vehi-
cle conflict and saw the members of the Desert Lily Lovers Society
coming up one side of his sand dune and, coming up the other, the
stalwarts of the Barstow Bombers.4
The level of emotional intensity has been at least as high over
Indian issues, though there are fewer people and acres involved:
while the United States owns over thirty percent of all land in the
country, Indians own about two and one-half percent of all the
nation's land, or fifty-two million acres.5 The recent but already
historic fishing rights dispute of the Pacific Northwest brought us
vivid memories of good fishers, Indian and non-Indian, who had
much in common but who saw themselves left with no alternative
but to wage a seemingly ceaseless campaign of sit-ins, fish-ins, and
resistances to arrest in order to preserve their respective liveli-
hoods, traditions, and, in the case of the Indians, religions.6 Ironi-
cally, they fought each other while knowing full well that the
2. Trueblood, Disaster on the Western Range, FIELD AND STREAM, January 22,
1975, at 14; Weiskopf, Wild West Showdown, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 5, 1975, at
87; see generally Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340
(1976); Note, Constitutionality ofthe Free Roaming Wild Horses and Burros Act. The
Ecosystem and the Property Clause in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 7 ENVTL. L. 137 (1976).
3. See generally Fraker & Lubenow, Redwood Protest: Loggers' Demonstration
Against Major Expansion, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 25, 1977, at 30; Giant Battle in Redwood
Country, Bus. WEEK, Apr. 25, 1977, at 30; Logger Outcry Obscures Slow Death of
Ancient Park Redwoods, NAT'L PARKS & CONSERVATION MAG., June, 1977, at 22.
For the Redwood Park litigation, see Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, 424
F. Supp. 172 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, 398 F.
Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, 376 F. Supp.
90 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Hudson, Sierra Club v. Department of Interior: The Fight to Pre-
serve Redwood National Park, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 781 (1979).
4. Jim Ruch (California Director for the Bureau of Land Management), untitled
address, reprinted in THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN NATURAL RESOURCES LAW
AND MANAGEMENT: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 204 (H.C. Dunning ed. 1981).
5. For Indian land statistics, see U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FEDERAL AND STATE
INDIAN RESERVATIONS (1975). For public land holdings, see BUREAU OF LAND
MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 10 (1977).
6. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY 108-13
(1970).
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depletion of the fish runs was caused by decades of poor logging
practices, overdevelopment of the watersheds, and collections of
dams. Taken together, these actions clouded, warmed, and throt-
tled most of the great salmon and steelhead streams from the Kla-
math River in California north to the Canadian border.7  The
Indian fish wars leave us with even more disturbing memories of
state officials who sought figuratively to stand astride Puget Sound
and the Columbia River in a manner all too reminiscent of the
way in which Orville Faubus literally stood astride a schoolhouse
threshold in Arkansas two decades earlier.8
Indian-state conflicts raise questions that may be even more elu-
sive of resolution than the resource dilemmas. Exactly who, for
example, should decide adoption and guardianship of young In-
dian children whose parents have by any standard gone awry-
progressive, well-educated state social workers, typically with am-
ple compassion for Indian people, or new tribal judges and newer-
yet tribal social workers, who understand the traditions and needs
of their people but typically lack formal education in the weighty
task of assigning young children to new homes and new parents?
One can quickly see, then, that bland words like jurisdiction,
regulation and governmental authority fail to alert us to the real
nature of the struggles on federal and Indian lands. These phrases
7. See, eg., A. NETBOY, THE COLUMBIA RIVER SALMON AND STEELHEAD TROUT:.
THEIR FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL 142-147 (1980).
8. This comparison was expressly made by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
language approved by the Supreme Court. Quoting from Puget Sound Gillnetters
Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 1978), the Court
made this observation concerning the conduct of Washington state officials:
The state's extraordinary machinations in resisting the [1974] decree have forced the
district court to take over a large share of the management of the state's fishery in
order to enforce its decrees. Except for some desegregation cases, the district court
has faced the most concerted official and private efforts to frustrate a decree of a
federal court witnessed in this century. The challenged orders in this appeal must
be reviewed by this court in the context of events forced by litigants who offered the
court no reasonable choice.
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658, 696 n.36 (1979) (citations omitted). See also United States v. Washington,
520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), ceri. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976), where the concurring
opinion stated:
The record in this case, and the history set forth in the Puy'allup and Antoine
cases, among others, make it crystal clear that it has been recalcitrance of Washing-
ton State officials (and their vocal non-Indian commercial and sports fishing allies)
which produced the denial of Indian rights requiring intervention by the district
court. This responsibility should neither escape notice nor be forgotten.
502 F.2d at 693 (Bums, J., concurring).
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all obscure a deeper well-spring: whether one group will be al-
lowed to impose its ideology on others. Wild Horse Annie, the
western rancher, the long-time Redwood Park hiker, the admirer
of the mariposa lily, the Barstow Bomber, the Indian fisher, the
steelheader, the tweed-jacketed professional social worker, the tri-
bal elder, and scores of other groups and individuals have each
found that a particular government-state, federal or tribal-
holds out the best hope for furthering their own deeply-held ideol-
ogies. To all of them the fulfillment or frustration of their ideolo-
gies is a deadly serious business. The Sagebrush Rebellion is one,
but not the only, result.
In this article, I will first summarize the legal and policy struc-
ture that allocates jurisdictional prerogatives and limitations-the
balance of ideology-on and near the federal and Indian lands in
the West. I will then assess the legitimate interests of the states on
federal and Indian lands. The question of legitimate interests is
pivotal: the fulfillment of those interests should be, and I think
will be, at the center of the continuing debate over whether, and
how, to alter the allocation of finances and ideology in this field.
I.
FEDERAL AND INDIAN JURISDICTION OVER ADJACENT
PRIVATE LANDS
Both the federal and Indian governments have authority to ex-
ercise jurisdiction on adjacent private lands as an incident of their
power to regulate their own lands. The United States has infre-
quently regulated off the federal lands to further public lands pol-
icy but, where it has, federal power has been upheld. 9 Such
9. E.g., Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897) (upholding a statutory
prohibition against fences on private lands that limit access to public lands). Federal
control over non-federal lands may also be achieved by administrative regulations,
rather than by express action in a statute, if the regulations are adopted pursuant to
delegated authority from Congress. United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977) (prohibition of hunting by Park Service); United
States v. Lindsey, 595 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1979) (prohibition of fires by Forest Service).
Private activities can also be affected-though not, technically, regulated-by the
establishment of federal reserved water rights. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S.
128 (1976). Federal reserved rights for purposes other than Indian reservations gener-
ally appear to be limited in scope. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696
(1978), and the authorities cited infra in notes 16 and 17.
The most recent court case involved a 1978 statute prohibiting motorized vehicles
on some non-federal holdings within the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness in
Minnesota. Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981), cer. denied, 102 S. Ct.
1645 (1982) (upholding congressional prohibition of motorboats and snowmobiles
within designated areas of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness). See gener.
[Vol. 2:2
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authority seems plainly to exist under the Property Clause, which
gives Congress broad powers to legislate over, and protect, federal
lands.'0 The limits, as opposed to the existence, of Property
Clause power over adjacent lands, may in the future pose more
difficult questions. We may reasonably wonder, for example,
what Congress and federal land managers can do to protect mi-
gratory wildlife whose habitat is primarily on federal lands or to
preserve the peace and quiet on public lands in the face of noise,
traffic, signs, and other activities on adjacent non-federal lands.I t
But such questions have just begun to come to the fore in the past
few years and are not likely to be asserted by the current adminis-
tration, which seems little interested in those kind of activist man-
agement practices.
Indian tribal governments have similar powers over private
land holdings within their reservations. In March 1981 the
Supreme Court, while recognizing that such tribal authority exists,
seemed to impose fairly tight strictures on the power: activity on
non-tribal lands must directly affect some significant tribal interest
or the tribe is without power. t2 The tough cases-those involving
pollution and migratory animals that use tribal lands as part of
ally Gaetke, The Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of 1978. Regulating
Non-Federal Property Under the Property Clause, 60 OR. L REv. 157 (1981).
10. The Property Clause of the Constitution provides that "Congress shall have
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Terri-
tory or other Property belonging to the United States .... U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3.
cL 2. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (upholding the Wild and Free
Roaming Horses and Burros Act on the ground that the Property Clause authorizes
Congress to protect wildlife living on public lands).
11. For a discussion of the power of Congress and, more specifically, the Park
Service, to regulate private lands adjacent to the national parks, see Sax, Helpless
Giants: The National Parks and the Regulation of Priate Lands, 75 MICH. L REv.
239 (1976). See also supra the Redwood Park opinions, note 3. The Park Service has
attempted, although not always successfully, to eliminate "aesthetic nuisances" adja-
cent to the parks. See, ag., United States v. Arlington County, [12 Decisions] ENv'T
REP. (BNA) 1817 (1979) (Arlington Tower); cf. New Jersey Builders Ass'n v. Dep't of
EnvL Protection, [13 Decisions] ENV'T REp. (BNA) 1541 (1979) (Pine Barrens). See
generally Gaetke, Congressional Discretion Under the Properlv ClauSe, 33 HASTINGS
LJ. 381 (1981).
12. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981) (no tribal authority to
regulate fishing by non-Indians on non-Indian land where the tribe was not histori-
cally a fishing tribe and where the tribe had long acquiesced to state regulation of
fishing by non-Indians). A subsequent case stands for considerably broader tribal
powers than suggested by Montana, although tribal regulation over non-Indians lands
was not directly involved. Merrion v. Jicarilia Apache Tribe, 102 S. CL 894 (1982).
Four circuit court opinions since Montana have upheld tribal authority over non-
Indians. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 657 (1981); Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead
Reservation v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1982); Cardin v. De La Cruz 671 F.2d
1982]
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their habitat-have not yet reached the Supreme Court. But they
soon will, since tribal governments, unlike federal officials now in
power, are avid to establish control over nearby lands when activi-
ties there affect tribal interests. In my judgment it is still too early
to define the contours of those tribal interests that will be sufficient
to allow tribal regulation of non-Indians on non-Indian land
within reservation boundaries.
Indian child custody, adoption and similar proceedings present
a dramatic departure from the principles just discussed. Tribes
have often resolved those kinds of issues for on-reservation chil-
dren. With Congress' express sanction in the Indian Child Wel-
fare Act of 1978, most tribes now have jurisdiction over these
critical issues even though the children may reside off the reserva-
tions.' 3 The 1978 Act is surely constitutional even though it
reaches into a sensitive subject matter historically committed to
state jurisdiction.' 4 To date, it is perhaps Congress' furthest reach
into state authority under the Indian Commerce Clause and dem-
onstrates the sweeping power of Congress to vest regulatory au-
thority in tribal governments, even outside of Indian country.
Indian reserved hunting and fishing rights, Indian reserved
water rights, and, to a much lesser extent, federal reserved water
rights also affect private lands, though they do not normally in-
volve regulation per se. 5 These rights are extraterritorial to In-
dian and federal lands, because persons on private land may be
required to allow anadromous fish or water to remain in the
stream even though they would be allowed to take the fish or cap-
ture the water under state law were it not for the reserved right.
United States v. New Mexico' 6 makes it clear that most federal
363 (9th Cir. 1982); Knight v. Shoshone & Arapahoe Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d 900
(10th Cir. 1982).
13. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (Supp. 11981). See
generally Guerrero, Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 7 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 51
(1979).
14. E.g., In the Matter of the Guardianship of D.L.L. and C.L.L., 291
N.W.2d 278, 281 (S.D. 1980). Congressional power under the Indian Commerce
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, is very broad. See, e.g., United States v. John,
437 U.S. 634 (1978); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977); United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). The Supreme Court has never found a congressional
action to be beyond the reach of congressional power under the Indian Commerce
Clause.
15. Some tribes, however, have sought to directly regulate non-Indian water rights
on private land. See, e.g., Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 657 (1982) (upholding tribal and federal authority).
16. 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (holding that the federal reservation of the Gila National
Forest did not impliedly reserve a minimum instream flow for "aesthetic, environ-
Vol. 2:2
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lands carry only minimal reserved water rights.' 7 But the prob-
able limited impact of federal reserved rights does not apply to
Indian resource rights. The Indian fishing cases, of course, have
made their mark during the 1970's on non-Indian commercial and
sport fishing and on the public consciousness.' 8 A major resource
issue in the 1980's and 1990's is likely to be attempts by tribes to
exercise their superior reserved water rights in the American West,
a region characterized by its geographic aridity and by its contem-
porary water crisis. 19
II.
STATE JURISDICTION ON FEDERAL AND INDIAN LANDS
In spite of the potential significance of federal and tribal juris-
diction on private lands, most of the emotions alluded to earlier
have been vented over the reverse situation, state jurisdiction on
federal and Indian lands. The subject has also been characterized
by a number of misconceptions. We need to divide the inquiry
into three separate kinds of lands: federal enclaves, federal re-
source lands, and Indian lands.
mental, recreational, or 'fish' purposes"). However, the majority opinion stated in
dictum: "Where water is necessary to fulfill the very purposes for which a federal
reservation was created, it is reasonable to conclude, even in the face of Congress'
express deference to state water law in other areas, that the United States intended to
reserve the necessary water." Id. at 702.
17. Exceptions include some low-elevation wildlife refuges established early in
this century, which may force cutbacks in irrigation on adjacent private lands. Fed-
eral Water Rights of the National Park Service, Fish & Wildlife Service, Bureau of
Reclamation & the Bureau of Land Management, 86 Interior Dec. 553, 602-04 (1979)
(Solic. Op.).
18. See, ag., Jones, Clamor Along the Klamath, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 4,
1979, at 30; Nash, Chippewas Want Their Rights: Disputes Over Hunting and Fihing
Regulations on Reservations in Michigan and Minnesota, Tim Nov. 26, 1979, at 54;
Starnes, New Indian Rooff, OUTDOOR LIFE, Oct. 1979, at 15.
19. See generally Back & Taylor, Navajo Water Rights: Pulling the Plug on the
Colorado River?, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 71 (1980); DuMars and Ingram. Congres-
sional Quantfication of Indian Reserved Water Rf'hts: A Definitive Solution or a A-
rage?, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 17 (1980); Note, Adjudication of Indian ater Rights:
Implementation of the 1979,4mendments to the Montana Water Use At, 41 MoT. L
Rav. 73 (1980); Note, Indian Reserved Water Rights the Winters of Our Discontent,
88 YALE LJ. 1689 (1979); Pelcyger, The Witers Doctrine and the Greening of the Res-
ervations, 4 J. CONTEMP. L. 19 (1977).
Popular attention has also focused on the issue of Indian water rights. See, eg.,
Gebhart, Who Owns the Missouri?, PROGRESSIVE 44 (1980); N.Y. Times, Dec. 17,
1980, at 15, coL 1; see also, Boslough, Rationing a River, SCIENCE '81, June 1981, at
26.
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A. Federal Enclaves
Most federal enclaves were established in earlier eras when a
need was perceived to create jurisdictional islands under exclusive
federal control so that specified federal activities could be con-
ducted without interference from the states. "Federal enclave"
too often is wrongly used as a generic term to describe all public
lands and even Indian lands. In fact, enclaves comprise only
about six percent of all federal lands. They were created by agree-
ments between states and the federal government in which the
state in question expressly transferred its jurisdiction to the United
States. 20 Enclaves include most post offices and federal office
buildings, all military bases, some national parks, and other mis-
cellaneous holdings. Almost without exception, resource develop-
ment on federal enclaves is not an issue.
They are not making many federal enclaves today2' but the
ones in existence continue to operate under so-called exclusive
federal jurisdiction. It is an outmoded kind of installation. Re-
cent cases have shown that the United States has ample protection
from the states by virtue of its sovereign immunity, its superior
sovereignty, and its ability to pass specialized laws to oust state
jurisdiction when necessary. 22 Further, "pure" federal enclaves
could often result in clumsy and ambiguous arrangements in the
many situations where no federal law is applicable and state law
could not be invoked due to the exclusivity of federal law. Con-
gress has sought to ameliorate the inconvenience by voluntarily
limiting federal exclusive jurisdiction to allow the operation of
specified state regulatory laws and tax laws.23 This "assimilation"
20. On federal enclaves, see generally G. CoGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL
PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 144-60 (1981).
21. In 1940 Congress curtailed the establishment of federal enclaves:
[Tihe flood of transfers of legislative jurisdiction was stayed, by an amendment to
section 355 of the Revised Statutes of the United States which eliminated the pre-
sumption of Federal acceptance [40 U.S.C. § 255 (1977)]... This ended a period
of 100 years during which the Federal Government, with relatively minor excep-
tions, acquired legislative jurisdiction over substantially all of its land acquisitions
within the States.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTbON 49-50 (1969).
22. E.g., infra notes 25 & 26.
23. Enclaves are said to be under "exclusive" federal jurisdiction but in fact state
laws have considerable effect in enclaves. Federal jurisdiction in an enclave can be
less than exclusive if the state reserved regulatory jurisdiction when the installation
was created. Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938). Criminal
cases arising in enclaves go to federal court, but state substantive criminal law applies
if no federal statute is on point. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1976); United States v. Sharpnack,
355 U.S. 286 (1958). National parks often incorporate state fishing laws and state
[Vol. 2:2
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of state law into enclaves is good lawmaking because the federal
government is not equipped to exercise the broad range of author-
ity we call the police power: health, safety, wildlife, criminal,
civil, and commercial laws are all the business of the states, which
have comprehensive codes to regulate such matters. In addition,
cash payments are made to the states in lieu of taxation of federal
enclave lands.24 Thus, even in federal enclaves, states exert con-
siderable legal influence and receive substantial revenues.
B. Resource Lands
For lack of a better term, all federal lands other than federal
enclaves can be lumped under the category of resource lands. Un-
like federal enclaves, states generally need no invitation or per-
mission to extend their laws onto the approximately 700 million
acres of resource lands. True, the states cannot directly tax or
zone federal land but that intergovernmental immunity of the
United States is narrow.25 True, the United States can preempt
(or override) state laws, but preemption requires affirmative action
by Congress. 26 In the meantime, state law governs.
27
The result, contrary to the popular perception, is that state laws
have extensive application on federal resource lands. That is ex-
actly as it should be, for-as noted above--the states' business is
to promulgate and enforce a comprehensive police power.
States have influence over, and receive benefits from, federal
resource lands even in those areas where their laws do not control.
As is the case with federal enclaves, Congress has voluntarily
made adjustments to accommodate the states. Numerous statutes
require the federal government to consult extensively with the af-
fishing licenses are required. The Buck Act allows states to collect income, gasoline,
sales, and use taxes in federal enclaves. 4 U.S.C. §§ 104-110 (1976). Congress also
has provided that state unemployment and workers' compensation laws apply. 26
U.S.C. § 3305(d) (1976); 40 U.S.C. § 290 (1976). A wide range of other laws apply,
including divorce, motor vehicle, child custody, and voting provisions. Impact Aid is
provided to some local school systems. See generallf Evans v. Comman, 398 U.S. 419
(1970).
24. See the reports of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
supra note 1.
25. E.g., United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977) (upholding Cali-
fornia tax on federal employees on their possessory interests in housing owned and
supplied to them by the federal government as part of the employees' compensation).
26. E.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (upholding federal preemp-
tion of state laws relating to wild horses and burros).
27. See generally Wilkinson, The Field of Public Land Law- Some Connecting
Threads and Future Directions, I PuB. LAND L. REv. 1, 19-23 (1980).
19821
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fected states over resource development and land-use planning
matters.28 And finances have hardly been ignored: recognizing
the states' inability to impose a property tax on federal lands,
Congress makes voluntary payments to the states. These pay-
ments totalled over two billion dollars in 1979, the last year for
which figures are available.2 9
But there is more, and we now move toward some mighty irony.
July 2, 1981 may prove to have been a fateful day in the history of
the American West. On that date the Supreme Court handed
down its opinion in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,30 up-
holding Montana's thirty-percent severance tax on coal extracted
in the state, including coal on the federal resource lands. This
enormous (that is Justice Blackmun's phrase 3l) source of revenue
may generate as much as twenty billion dollars for Montana alone
through the year 2010.32 I say there is powerful irony here be-
cause the Sagebrush Rebels' complaints over the burdens western
states must endure because of the presence of the public lands
now begin to ring a bit hollow. Indeed, there are many who have
begun calling the western states the "haves" and the remaining
states the "have nots" in the critical area of energy, due to the
concentration of easily accessible, low-sulphur federal coal and
other fuel minerals in the West.33
C. Indian Lands
The law regarding state jurisdiction on Indian lands is mark-
edly different because state jurisdiction is much more circum-
scribed, especially when Indians themselves are involved. For
most, but not all, purposes state law does not operate within the
boundaries of Indian reservations because of the long-standing
28. E.g., Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1720,
1721(c), 1733(d), 1747, 1765(a) (1976); National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16
U.S.C. § 1612 (1976); Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. § 661 (1976);
Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4231-4233 (1976). State
wildlife laws have pervasive application on federal resource lands. Coggins, The Law
of Wildlife Management on the Federal Public Lands, 60 OR. L. REV. 59 (1981).
29. ADVISORY COMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL., PAYMENTS IN LIEU OF
TAXES ON FEDERAL REAL PROPERTY, supra note 1, at 47.
30. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
31. Id. at 641 (dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun).
32. Id.
33. E.g., SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY PROGRAM, UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA,
ENERGY FROM THE WEST: A TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT OF WESTERN RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENT (1981).
[Vol. 2:2
1982] LEGITIMATE STATE INTERESTS
federal commitment to protect tribal self-government.Y The
courts have been fairly quick to find that federal laws have occu-
pied the field and that state laws are excluded, especially when
non-Indians are doing business with Indians. 35 When no specific
federal law is controlling, various results in favor of or against
state jurisdiction have been reached depending on whether the ap-
plication of state law would "infringe upon tribal self-govern-
ment. ' 36 Where only Indians are involved, the courts have been
extremely reluctant to allow any state or local jurisdiction because
the application of a state law to a tribe or reservation Indian nor-
mally has some impact on tribal self-government.3 7 The only
state laws that have been upheld against Indians in Indian country
during the modem era are requirements that Indians collect state
taxes when sales of cigarettes are made to non-Indians; sales to
Indians, however, are exempt from taxation.38 States receive
financial revenues from Indian reservations in a variety of ways.
39
34. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); McClana-
han v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). See generally F. CoHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 270-79 (1982 ed.).
Under "Public Law 280," states have civil and criminal judicial, but not regulatory,
jurisdiction over designated reservations. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, CI. 505, § 7, 67
Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162,25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326,28 U.S.C.
§§ 1360, 1360 note). For a detailed analysis, see Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Lbn.
its of State Jurisdiciton Over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L REV. 535 (1975). The
Act allows state judicial jurisdiction over private causes of action on affected reserva-
tions but does not extend state tax or regulatory laws into Indian county. Bryan v.
Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
There are special complex, statutory provisions for criminal cases on reservations
not covered by "Public Law 280." See generally Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over
Indian Lands: 4 Journey Through a Jurisdictional Mfaze, 18 ARIZ. L REV. 503 (1976);
F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 286-308 (1982 ed.).
35. Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980);
Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
36. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (state not al-
lowed to tax non-Indian logging company doing business with tribe); Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (state allowed to
tax sales of cigarettes by Indians to non-Indians); Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S.
423 (1971) (state court not allowed to assert jurisdiction over contract action by non-
Indian against Indian); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (same). Cf. Montana v.
United States, 440 U.S. 544 (1981) (state allowed to regulate fishing by non-Indians
on facts of case).
37. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n,
443 U.S. 658 (1979); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976); McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
38. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. 134 (1980); Moe v. Confederated Salish and Koutenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463
(1976). Outside of Indian country, state law presumptively applies to Indians. Eg.,
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
39. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF INDIAN LAW 676-77 (1982 ed.).
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The restrictive nature of state jurisdiction in Indian country is
due to a number of legal and historical factors. The central reason
is that Indian treaties were, at their essence, not just a guarantee of
a tribal land base but also a promise of a tribal jurisdictional base.
The treaties were intended to make jurisdictional islands of Indian
reservations where the tribes could govern themselves and be free
of local non-Indian pressures.40 Those notions have been eroded
somewhat and are not absolute today, but they continue to explain
why the courts and Congress have generally been stingy in al-
lowing state jurisdiction in Indian country.
III.
LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE STATES
The preceding discussion is a summary of the law as it is. I
would like to spend some time now evaluating it in very general
terms. The ultimate question is whether the existing structure
substantially recognizes and fulfills the legitimate interests of the
states.
To begin the discussion I must allude to the Sagebrush Rebel-
lion. This movement is not new. It is a continuation of senti-
ments that were heartfelt when the first settlers cut over the
Appalachians into the Ohio Valley: administrators in far-away
Washington should not control settlers on the furthest reaches of
the continent. That concern-variously phrased as local rights or
states rights-raged in Alabama and Missouri in the 1830's, in
Texas and Wisconsin in the 1840's, in California and Oregon in
the 1850's, in Nevada and Colorado in the 1860's, and so on.4 1
And it rages today. But that general concern for local control
needs to be parsed. Some elements of that broad concern are le-
gitimate and some are not.
The Sagebrush Rebellion is bankrupt on an essential issue. The
most expansive claim of the Sagebrush Rebels is that the states are
entitled as a matter of law to have the public lands in the West, or
most of them, transferred to the western states. The Rebels usu-
ally argue that the original thirteen states do not have large blocs
of federal lands within their boundaries and that the western
states, as a matter of constitutional law and fairness, should be
40. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 102 S. Ct. 894 (1982).
41. See generally Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, Polities and
FederalLands, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 317, 317-329 (1980).
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similarly situated.42 This is misleading as a matter of history and
law.
The original thirteen states owned-under settled principles of
American property law-most of the land within their boundaries
after the American Revolution. When they entered the union
they refused to relinquish that ownership to the new federal gov-
ernment.43 That was their prerogative, as property owners.
Then the United States acquired vast areas of land. The young
nation negotiated the Louisiana Purchase with France, the North-
west Compromise with Great Britain, the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hildalgo and the Gadsden Purchase with Mexico, the Alaska
Treaty with Russia, and others.44 The United States acquired that
land in fee simple absolute-as complete owner--subject only to a
small number of perfected private titles and to the rights of Indi-
ans to reside upon the land.45 There were no states to claim
ownership.
The United States began to create territories, then states, out of
its public domain. Whenever a state was to be carved out of a
territory, the United States made a bargain with the representa-
tives of the territory. The bargaining for land was always fierce.
In addition to smaller grants for specific purposes, the early states
received grants for schools of one section in each township, rough-
ly 1/36th of the land within the state. Later states normally were
granted two school sections in each township. Utah, Arizona, and
New Mexico received more and Alaska, in 1959, received more
yet.46 But it was always a bargain with explicit rules crafted by
American property law;47 the United States owned the land and
states obtained whatever they were able to bargain for. After each
42. The Rebels' position is summarized in Note, The Sagebrush Rebellonv Who
Should Control the Public Lands?, 1980 UTAH L. REv. 505, 516-25. See also Note,
The Property Power, Federalism and the Equal Footing Doctrine, 80 COLUM. L REv.
817 (1980).
43. Although the original states retained title to lands within their borders, they
agreed to cede to the United States their claims to lands beyond their western bound-
aries. P. GATES, HISTORY OF PuBLIc LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 49-57 (1968).
44. Id. at 75-86.
45. In treaties providing for acquisition of land from foreign nations, the United
States agreed that grantees of land from those nations would retain title to their prop-
erty. B. HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND PoLuciEs 23-25 (1965). On the
rights of the United States vis-a-vis the Indian tribes, see Johnson v. M'lntosh, 21 U.S.
(8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
46. P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 285-318 (1968).
47. The Supreme Court has analogized statehood transactions to contracts be-
tween private parties. Eg., Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 507 (1980); Steams v. Min-
nesota, 179 U.S. 223, 249-50 (1900).
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statehood transaction most land in the region remained in federal
ownership, just as it had been before the transaction. Most west-
ern states expressly agreed to "forever disclaim all right and title
to the unappropriated public lands" within the state and to leave
federal lands "at the sole and entire disposition of the United
States."
48
A few cases during the mid-nineteenth century suggested, al-
ways in dictum, that the United States retained its land with the
idea that it would later be transferred away to the states or private
parties.49 The Supreme Court was paraphrasing-with considera-
ble accuracy-the nature of Congressional policy at that time.
Congressional policy has since changed, just as any property own-
er has the right to consider selling its property and then to recant
when circumstances change. The general language in those two or
three court opinions has never been a rule of law, has not been
followed, and has been discredited in a modern context.
50
The United States owns the land. The states have no legitimate
claim to ownership. But the existence of federal ownership does
not settle policy issues of how much control the western states
should have over land owned by the federal government within
their boundaries.
Plainly state control cannot be justified simply by saying that
federal land should be subject to state regulation because private
land within state boundaries is subject to state law. This analysis
48. Act of Mar. 3, 1975, 18 Stat. 474, 475 (Colorado Enabling Act). See also, e.g.,
Act of Mar. 21, 1864, 13 Stat. 30, 31 (Nevada Enabling Act); Act of July 16, 1894, 28
Stat. 107, 108 (Utah Enabling Act). Earlier statehood acts had disclaimed state own-
ership over public lands with different language, but with the same legal result. See,
e.g., Act of Sept. 9, 1850, 9 Stat. 452,452-53 (1850) (California Statehood Act); Act of
Feb. 14, 1859, 11 Stat. 383, 384 (Oregon Statehood Act). See generally Leshy, Unrav-
eling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, Politics and Federal Lands, 14 U.C.D. L. REV.
317, 324-25 (1980).
Of the western states, only Texas and Hawaii depart from the pattern outlined in
the text. Texas, as an independent Republic at the time of statehood, retained title to
lands within its state boundaries. P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVEL-
OPMENT 80-83 (1968). Therefore, there was never public domain land in Texas and
all. public lands in that state have been acquired by the United States since statehood.
In Hawaii there was no unalienated public domain land remaining by the time of
statehood in 1959. Id. at 316.
49. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 221-24 (1845). See also Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367
(1842).
50. A unanimous Supreme Court has squarely held that the federal government
exerts sovereign authority over the public lands. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529
(1976). See generaly Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14
U.C.D. L. REV. 269, 278-80, 305-06 (1980) and the authorities cited there.
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first ignores the fact that in our federal system the United States is
a sovereign superior to local, county, and state governments-a
superiority born of necessity after the quantum of local power
under the Articles of Confederation had proved too cumber-
some.5' That essential supremacy is rooted in the Constitution
and subject to no serious debate today. The unacceptable scatter-
ing effect of fifty superior governments is evident. Second, claims
to state control must recognize that the ultimate owners of the
public lands are literally all of the citizens of the United States.
United States citizens in the West may be specially affected by the
public land-for good and for bad-but all citizens have a stake
in the western public lands and their resources: energy, hard rock
minerals, timber, beef, water, recreation, and wilderness.
Nevertheless, citizens of western states can claim a special inter-
est in public lands management. Because they live there, they
may use, or be affected by uses on, the public lands to a dispropor-
tionate degree. Public lands policy more often and more directly
affects their businesses and jobs; their hiking trails and snowmo-
bile runs; their air, water, and vistas; and their tax rates.
Recognizing, then, a somewhat more diffuse national interest
and a somewhat more direct western interest, how can we articu-
late the legitimate interests of the state governments on the federal
lands? First, there is, in my view, an absolute right to economic
equity. Federal installations cause local and state governments
economic burdens (the costs of some roads, police and court sys-
tems, water and sewer service, and other services) and also eco-
nomic benefits (federally constructed roads, fire protection,
landing strips, and others). State and local governments should be
made whole for the net costs of these financial burdens. This is no
easy task. It is a tremendously technical and complex matter. As
noted, the financial burdens imposed on the states by public lands
policy are addressed by an extensive, shifting matrix of statutes. 2
Federal policy and law in this area should be continually re-eval-
uated as conditions change to be certain that the states are receiv-
ing economic equity.
What of the right asserted by the Sagebrush Rebels to control
activities on public lands? There is sound basis for a state interest
in regulating some conduct by private persons on the public lands;
activities there may have impacts on private lands and, as noted,
51. E.., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 321-24 (1978).
52. See supra notes 23, 24, 28 & 29.
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states have functioning systems to exercise the full range of police
powers. But it flows irresistably from the fact of federal owner-
ship and from the superior constitutional federal sovereignty that
federal programs should not be subject to interference by the
states. Thus states have a second broad legitimate interest, the
right to exercise the police power over activities by private persons
on the public lands up to the point that an ongoing federal pro-
gram is thwarted. To give an example in resource development, it
seems to me that a state should legitimately be able to regulate
and control the environmental impacts of hardrock mining or
mineral leasing but that it should not be able to zone federal land
so as to prohibit that kind of activity outright.
Even in those areas of federal policy not directly subject to state
control, the western states continue to have a legitimate interest in
being heard and responded to when federal concerns do not ra-
tionally outweigh local concerns.53 Though the eastern states'
voice in public land policy can be adequately met by representa-
tion in Congress, that level of participation is insufficient for west-
ern states: access to Congress alone would not recognize the
special western interest in the public lands and would not be suffi-
ciently site-specific. It would not insure sufficient influence over
on-the-ground decisions. The right of affected western govern-
ments to be heard must be expressly recognized by statutes and
must be implemented in the land-management agencies. As
noted, there is in place a range of statutory provisions that require
federal land managers to consult with state and local interests and,
where practical, to conform federal programs to state and local
requirements.5 4 Like the western interest in economic equity, the
right to be heard should be continually evaluated and improved
so that those western interests specially affected have a truly effec-
tive statutory right to be heard-early and at length. This would
allow those often-conflicting state and local views to be meshed
with more general (and also often conflicting) national
considerations.
53. The Public Land Law Review Commission, in acknowledging that state and
local interests have special concerns in public lands management, identified six cate-
gories of interests that should be recognized in making public lands policy: (1) the
national public; (2) the regional public; (3) the Federal Government as sovereign;
(4) the Federal Government as proprietor, (5) state and local governments; (6) the
users of public lands and resources. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMM., ONE THIRD
OF THE NATION'S LAND: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONORESS 6
(1970).
54. See supra note 28.
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Thus I would catalogue three legitimate interests of the states
on the federal lands: the right to economic equity; the right to
impose the police power where it is not inconsistent with federal
programs; and the right, even when programs are outside the po-
lice power, to have special notice and an opportunity to be heard.
The legitimate interests of state and local governments are dif-
ferent with regard to Indian land. First, the federal role is not the
same as with federal lands: Indian lands are held by the United
States pursuant to a special trust relationship, not for the general
public, but for Indian tribes and individuals. 55 Therefore, Indian
lands are not public lands.56 Federal policy, properly reacting to
views of Indians expressed during treaty negotiations and ever
since, has been to protect Indian tribes from state and local inter-
ests-to provide a buffer between Indians and racism, economic
sharp dealing, and, more abstractly but no less real, ethnocentric
views of non-Indians on how Indians should behave.57 Further,
the presence of tribal governments makes the states' responsibili-
ties more modest in Indian country, where there are operating tri-
bal legislatures, courts, police, natural resource agencies, social
service bureaus, and often schools. Just as the burdens on the
state in Indian country are markedly less, so are their powers.
That diminished role flows directly from the special place of In-
dian lands in our history, law, and policy.
58
55. Eg., United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980); Delaware
Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977); Seminole Nation v. United
States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942).
56. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 209 n.19 (1982 ed.).
57. Early federal policy imposed a wide range of restrictions, most of which re-
main in effect today, on persons engaging in trade with Indians. See generally F.
PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS: INDIAN TRADE AND
INTERCOURSE ACT, 1790-1834 (1962). In the mid-1800's, reservations were set aside
for tribes. S. TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 71-88 (1973). Large blocs of land
were lost to Indians as a result of the allotment policy of the late 19th century, D.
OTIS, THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS (F. Prucha ed.,
1973), and the termination policy of the mid-20th century, Wilkinson & Biggs, The
Evolution ofthe Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139 (1977). Since the early
1960's the Indian land base has actually expanded and Congress has adopted a policy
of "self-determination" for Indian tribes. Israel, The Reemergence of Tribal National-
ism and Its Impact on Reservation Resource Development, 47 COLO. L. REV. 617
(1976); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 388 n.14 (1976) ("Present federal policy
appears to be returning to a focus upon strengthening tribal self-government [citations
omitted].").
Two progressive pieces of recent legislation go further than protecting Indian re-
sources and expressly seek to preserve Indian culture and religion. See American
Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1996 (West Supp. 1981); Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (Supp. III 1979).
58. A leading explication of the special legal status of Indian tribes is Morton v.
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The states plainly have an absolute right to economic equity in
Indian country, as they do on the public lands. But on Indian
lands the states cannot lay claim to being a special constituency.
The special constituency there is the Indian people. Thus, on In-
dian lands, the legitimate state interests in participating in Indian
policy is akin to the role of non-Westerners in public lands policy:
state officials should have representation in the making of Indian
policy but access is most appropriate in Congress, where broad
decisions are made.
Day-to-day decisions on Indian lands should be made primarily
by tribal officials and secondarily by federal officials, with only the
narrowest state encroachment allowed when activities on Indian
lands have extraordinary impacts on essential state interests.5 9
Tribal governments are small and they are young; traditional gov-
ernments were smothered by federal policy during the nineteenth
century and were not allowed to breathe again until the 1960's.60
Like any small or young governments-whether they be develop-
ing nations, federal territories and states in the old American
West, or cities and counties-Indian tribes will have their growth
stunted if their responsibilities are borne by others. These con-
cerns, the keynote of both old treaties and new statutes, burn
brighter and hotter than the interests of the states.
IV.
EVALUATION OF CURRENT POLICY
And how do current policy and law comport with these legiti-
mate interests of state and local governments? My own conclu-
sion is that the public lands legislation of the 1970's, easily the
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), upholding a hiring preference for Indians in the Bureau
of Indian Affairs. The court recognized that numerous federal laws "single out for
special treatment a constituency of tribal Indians living on or near reservations." Id.
at 554. "This unique legal status is long standing, see Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 5
Pet. 1, 8 L. Ed. 25 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 8 L. Ed. 483 (1832), and its
sources are diverse." Id. at 555.
59. The courts have recognized a state right to regulate special Indian rights in
rare and extreme circumstances. Thus state regulation of Indian fishing is allowed for
"conservation purposes." E.g., Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44,
49 (1973); Washington v. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 682 (1979).
This state right is exceedingly narrow and is apparently triggered only on a showing
that the tribes themselves are incapable of exerting sufficient governmental control
and that the state has first prohibited all fishing by non-Indians. United States v.
Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 280-81 (W.D. Mich. 1980), aff'd, 653 F.2d 277 (6th Cir.
1981); United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
60. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW ch. 2 (1982 ed.).
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most intense period of Congressional scrutiny in this field in the
nation's history, fairly reflects these legitimate interests. 6' The
laws of the modem era are characterized, above all, by careful
compromise among the many interests. 62 The states are accorded
broad police power over private conduct in federal territory when
the United States has not asserted its supremacy.63 In several in-
stances state authority extends to resource development. 64 As they
should be, the states are denied land ownership and policy control
over those areas, mostly involving resource development, where
the United States has legislated pursuant to its paramount author-
ity. But in spite of superior federal constitutional power, the sys-
tem now in place is struggling mightily to assure the western states
financial equity65 and policy influence66 on a highly preferential
basis. The existing corpus of legislation, much of it recently en-
acted, needs to be refined, a process that will be a continuing one.
61. On the recent legislation, see generally S. DANA & S. FAIRFAX, FOREST AND
RANGE POLICY (2d ed. 1980); G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND
AND RESOURCES LAW (1981).
62. The two dominant statutes are the National Forest Management Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1976) and
scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.) (NFMA) and the Federal Land Policy and Manage-
ment Act of 1976 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976) and in scattered sections
of 7, 16, 30 and 40 U.S.C.) (FLPMA). Both are umbrella laws that attempt to bring
most of the basic authority of the Forest Service and the BLM, respectively, within
their ambits. Lobbying was intense and both laws struck a middle course. On the
NFMA, see the several articles in the symposium in 8 ENVTL L 239 (1978). A sym-
posium on FLPMA is at 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 267 (1979). One can gain a sense of the six-
year flow of trade-offs in FLPMA by reviewing the summary of its legislative history.
SENATE COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE FEDERAL LAND POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(Comm. Print 1978). See also, eg., Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Morton, 500
F. Supp. 1338, 1340 (D. Wyo. 1980), appealpending ("FLPMA's policy directives
clearly attempt to strike a balance between the development of mineral resources and
environmental concerns."); Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1002 (D. Utah 1979)
("FLPMA represents an attempt on the part of Congress to balance a variety of com-
peting interests...").
63. See supra notes 23 & 27 and accompanying text.
64. State regulatory authority is especially broad over resource activities on the
public lands in regard to water law, eg., California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645
(1978), California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142
(1935); and hardrock mining, eg., 30 U.S.C. §§ 24,26,28, 28b, 38 and 43 (1976), State
exreL Cox v. Hibbard, 31 Or. App. 269, 570 P.2d 1190 (1977). There is also room for
state law to operate in other areas, such as mineral leasing, eg., Texas Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 277 F. Supp. 366 (W.D. Okla. 1967), af'd, 406 F.2d
1303 (10th Cir. 1969), but federal preemption of state and local regulatory activities is
common, eg., Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd
445 U.S. 947 (1980).
65. See supra notes 23, 24, & 29-33 and accompanying texts.
66. See supra note 28.
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But wholesale changes would be wrong; the present system, which
respects local views while being premised on national supremacy,
fairly reflects the overriding reality that these resources are na-
tional, not local, possessions.
Similarly, I would judge that the states' legitimate interests are
being substantially achieved on Indian lands. Where no interests
of the tribes or individual Indians are at stake, state police power
can be exercised. 67 If there is some nexus with Indian interests,
state law has a narrow ambit and tribal or federal law is likely to
control. Unlike the states' broader role on the public lands, the
states have no general statutory right to be consulted on decisions
on Indian lands. This limited theatre for the states befits a situa-
tion where tribal governments can fill any governmental void:
"The tradition in Indian country is tribal, not state, police
power."68
In broadest terms, then, the comprehensive scheme of public
lands statutes allows substantial financial returns to the states, a
considerable residuum of state police power over private activities
where the federal government has not preempted state law, and
broad-based consultation in those areas where the United States
has legislated. This might be called a "mixed police power-in-
tensive consultation" model. The statutes and court cases in the
Indian field allow significantly less state participation, a "tribal
dominant" model. These schemes are preferable to the total ex-
clusion of state law because such an approach would fail to meet
the states' legitimate needs. Other models, "state ownership" (title
to land in the states) and "state supremacy" (title to public land in
the United States and title to Indian lands with Indian tribes, but
paramount legislative authority in the states) are in turn inappro-
priate because state interests are outweighed by clearly-estab-
lished supremacy, the need for a relatively uniform national
development and conservation policy, and special Indian rights.
Yet another approach, tilted toward state control, is the "state
law subject to federal veto" model found in the Coastal Zone
Management Act.69 That Act allows states, with federal funding,
to develop plans for the coastal zone that go into effect upon ap-
proval by the Secretary of Commerce. But coastal zone planning,
which is entirely appropriate in its own context, is fundamentally
distinguishable because most lands in the coastal zone are not in
67. See supra notes 34-40 & 55-60 and accompanying texts.
68. F. Cohen, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 270 (1982 ed.)
69. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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federal ownership so that the proper starting point is traditional
state police power. Indeed, federal lands in the coastal zone are
excepted from coverage under the Act.
7 0
Calls for revamping the current system to allow for increased
state control come from many sides-Sagebrush Rebels pressing
to expand development opportunities,7' non-Indian groups aim-
ing to limit tribal powers,7 2 even environmentalists seeking to cur-
tail the authority of a development-oriented administration in
favor of western states that show signs of becoming increasingly
conservation-minded. 73 Policy-makers should take a larger view.
70. "Excluded from the coastal zone are lands the use of which is by law subject
solely to the discretion of or which is held in trust by the Federal Government, its
officers or agents." 16 U.S.C. § 1453(l) (1976). See generally Note, Coastal Zone
Management and excluded Federal Lands: The Viabiity, of Continued Federalism in the
Management of Federal Coastlands, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1011 (1979).
Although excluded from the Coastal Zone Management Act's definition of the
coastal zone, activities on federal lands may be subject to the Act's consistency provi-
sions, requiring that federal actions directly affecting the coastal zone be consistent
with the state's federally-approved program to the maximum extent practicable. 16
U.S.C. § 1456(c), (d) (1976). See generally Deller, Federalism and Offshore Oil and
Gas Leasing: Must Federal Tract Selections and Lease Stipulations Be Consistent ,ith
State Coastal Zone Management Programs? 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 105 (1980); California
ex rel Brown v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). In some circumstances the
Secretary of Commerce can override the consistency requirement upon a finding that
the proposed federal action is consistent with the Act's objectives or otherwise neces-
sary in the interests of national security. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(d) (1976).
The consistency provisions of the Coastal Zone Management Act have their coun-
terparts in existing laws relating to the public lands. See supra note 28; Columbia
Basin Land Protection Ass'n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 602-06 (9th Cir. 1981).
71. E.g., 125 Cong. Rec. S11665 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Orrin G.
Hatch).
72. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country" A Defense of Federal Protection of
Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REv. 979, 980-82 (1981) (discus-
sion of opposition to special separate status of Indian tribes).
73. Governor Bruce Babbitt of Arizona, who opposes the Sagebrush Rebellion
and many of the resource development policies of the current administration, is stud-
ying various legislative approaches that would limit federal authority and increase
state authority on the public lands. Though not committed to such an approach, Bab-
bitt believes that the Coastal Zone Management Act, discussed supra in note 70, may
provide a model preferable to current law. Babbitt's premise is that state preservation
practices may well be superior to federal policies. Symposium, Northwestern School
of Law, Lewis & Clark School of Law, Portland, Or. (Feb. 5, 1982) (unpublished
address).
Babbitt's views are a reminder that it is overly simplistic to view the western states
as being more development-oriented than the federal government during the modern
era. In fact, there are numerous examples of attempts by states to halt or limit federal
development activities on conservation grounds. See, eg., Washington Dept. of
Game v. FPC, 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953), cerL denied, 347 U.S. 936 (1954) (opposi-
tion by Washington to federal dam); Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon. 349 U.S. 435
(1955) (opposition by Oregon to federal dam); South Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F.2d
1190 (8th Cir. 1980) (opposition by South Dakota to issuance of mining patents);
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Change should be made on principle, not in response to the per-
sonalities on the stage at a particular moment in time. Progres-
sive, newly formulated policies have been conceived during a
decade of intensive reflection and formulation. They should be
given time to mature in an atmosphere substantially devoid of the
disruptive effects of wholesale legislative restructuring.
Neither public land policy nor Indian policy, then, needs still
more statutes and land transfers. The main outlines of the present
system preserve vital prerogatives of the national public and In-
dian tribes while assuring fairness to the western states on both
federal and Indian lands.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, we have learned from recent federal land and In-
dian policy that not all great experiments in the laboratory that is
federalism occur at the state and local level. There are many ex-
amples of creative federal contributions, but a leading one is so
bold and idealistic as to amount to an attempt to disprove the
premise of the Turner thesis.74 After the passage of the Alaska
Lands Act in late 1980, we-who were the first nation in the world
to experiment with legislatively-protected wilderness-now have
some eighty million acres of land in wilderness. 75 That is four
percent of all land in the country. You can add to it roadless land
of a like quantity in national parks, forests, and wildlife refuges.
This is not a frontier to live in, which is the point that Turner
made. But it is a frontier to be in, so powerful a wild frontier as to
California v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Cal. 1980) (opposition by California to
development on roadless areas in national forests); California ex rel. Brown v. Watt,
683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982) (opposition by California to off-shore oil leases).
74. Turner based his analysis of the importance of the frontier in the nation's past,
and its demise in the late nineteenth century, on the statement in the Eleventh Census
that, as of 1890, "the unsettled area [of the United States] has been so broken into by
isolated bodies of settlement that there can hardly be said to be a frontier line." F.
TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1 (1920).
75. On the United States' pioneering efforts in establishing official wilderness ar-
eas, see J. HENDEE, G. STANKEY & R. LUCAS, WILDERNESS MANAGEMENT 27-59
(1978). See generally R. NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND (rev. ed.
1973); G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LANDS AND RESOURCES LAW
766-839 (1981). After the addition of approximately fifty-seven million acres to the
Wilderness Preservation System by means of the Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (codified in scattered
sections of 16 U.S.C.), the system today includes approximately 79.8 milion acres.
Telephone conservation with Richard Joy, Wilderness Office, United States Forest
Service, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 19, 1981).
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enflame the minds of many of us though we be hundreds or
thousands of miles from it.
Our Indian land policy, with all of its horror, is still considered
the most progressive of any nation towards its aboriginal people.
76
Today there are still the Ye-be-chei dances on the Navajo Reser-
vation, the Sun Dance in South Dakota, and the Grey Horse
dances in Oklahoma. And there are still discrete groups to chal-
lenge the premises of the majority society, to stand as bastions
against a world that is too fast, too rude, and too materialistic.
This geographic and cultural diversity is one of the proudest ele-
ments of public land and Indian policy.
So, in sum, we risk a good many dangers when we fail fully and
fairly to protect the legitimate interests of the state and local gov-
ernments in the West. But we take risks, too, when we accord
those governments more than their legitimate interests. No, the
public and Indian lands are not a burden on the American West.
They are the hallmark of the American West. They are perhaps
the most distinctive and positive and glorious elements of the way
of life in the West. Without them, the American West really
would pass on.
Perhaps our descendants in misty generations hence will have
to answer tragic questions: How much was it worth to have lost
the frontier? How much was it worth to have lost the culture of
another people? But I continue to hope and believe that these and
similar questions are ones to which no American will ever be held
to answer.
76. See generally Cohen, Oiginal Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28 (1947) and the
several articles beginning at 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 617 (1978).
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